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I. INTRODUCTIONF OR MANY, aircraft evoke a visceral thrill and sense of ro-
mance as they push the limits of human experience and
transcend geographical boundaries on a regular basis. To avia-
tion financiers, however, the inherent internationality and mo-
bility of aircraft equipment (i.e., airframes, aircraft engines, and
helicopters)' present special challenges. The quality of interna-
tionality is intensified by the fact that several capital markets
often finance a single aircraft given the airline industry's heavy
dependence on external finance,2 as well as the industry trend
of airframes being "dealt in and financed separately" from air-
craft engines.' The internationality and mobility of aviation fi-
nance makes it difficult for creditors to exert a degree of control
I Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment
on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment art. 1(2) (c), Nov. 16, 2001, 118 Stat.
1095, 2367 U.N.T.S. 615 [hereinafter Aircraft Protocol]; see also id. arts. I(2) (b),
I(2)(e), I(2)(1) (for specific definitions of airframes, aircraft engines, and
helicopters).
2 Anthony Saunders et al., The Economic Implications of International Secured
Transactions Law Reform: A Case Study, 20 UNIv. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 309, 312
(1999).
3 Roy GOODE, EXPLANATORY REPORT AND COMMENTARY ON DRAr [UNIDROIT]
CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN MOBILE EQUIPMENT AND DRAFr PRO-
TOCOL THERETO ON MATTERS SPECIFIC To AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT 4 (Int'l Civil Avia-
tion Org., ICAO Doc. DCME-1P/2, 2001) [hereinafter GOODE, EXPLANATORY
REPORT AND COMMENTARY]; see also Mark Arundell & F. Scott Wilson, The Need for
FIRST-TO-REGISTER RULE
over the equipment that they finance and "protect themselves
against the possibility of [unauthorized] movement," especially
when they are not even well-positioned to know when move-
ment takes place.4
This difficulty is exacerbated by the lack of uniformity across
jurisdictions with regards to secured transactions law. Without
uniformity, the means of creating security interests (creation),
their "effectiveness against third parties" (perfection), their pri-
ority vis-A-vis other interests (priority), and the rights and reme-
dies available to creditors to enforce them (enforcement) will
differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.' The traditional lex rei
sitae rule governing proprietary rights,' which "applies the law
. . . of the jurisdiction in which the mobile asset is situated to
determine [legal] questions," addresses the lack of uniformity
problem to a certain extent, but is clearly "unsuited to [highly]
mobile equipment" such as aircraft equipment because the ap-
plicable law would change far too frequently.'
Taking into account the high credit risk-the business of air-
craft repossession is even said to carry mortal risk-creditors
may refuse to lend or charge higher interest on loans. In an
effort to "induce the assumption of risk and the release of
funds"8 as well as reduce the cost of financing mobile equip-
ment such as aircraft objects, the Governing Council of the In-
ternational Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT) authorized the creation of a study group in 1992
to draft uniform rules on international aspects of security inter-
ests in mobile equipment, a project that started from a 1988 pro-
posal made by its Canadian member, Mr. T.B. Smith QC.' Over
International Secured Transactions and Leasing Rules for Aircraft Engines through the
Proposed UNIDROIT Convention, 23 AIR & SPACE L. 283 (1998).
4 GOODE, EXPLANATORY REPORT AND COMMENTARY, supra note 3; see also
Thomas J. Gallagher, Assessment of the Anticipated Economic Benefits of the UNIDROIT
Convention, 23 AIR & SPACE L. 294, 296 (1998).
5 Otherwise known as the four cornerstones of secured transactions law, bor-
rowing the terminology used in Michel Deschamps, The Perfection and Priority
Rules of the Cape Town Convention and the Aircraft Protocol: A Comparative Law Analy-
sis, 1 CAPE TowN CONVENTION J. 51, 51-52 (2013).
6 GOODE, EXPLANATORY REPORT & COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 2.
7 Id.; Jeffrey Wool, The Next Generation of International Aviation Finance Law: An
Overview of the Proposed UNIDROIT Convention on International Interests in Mobile
Equipment as Applied to Aircraft Equipment, 20 UNIv. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 499,
501-02 (1999).
8 GOODE, EXPLANATORY REPORT AND COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 2.
9 Roy Goode, From Acorn to Oak Tree: The Development of the Cape Town Conven-
tion and Protocols, 17 UNIFORM L. REV. 599, 599 (2012) [hereinafter Goode, From
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the years, the project developed into a comprehensive interna-
tional convention accompanied by three protocols, each dealing
with a particular category of equipment."o The International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Air Transport
Association (IATA), and the Aviation Working Group (AWG)"I
together accomplished the work concerning aircraft equipment
that culminated in the signing of the Convention on Interna-
tional Interests in Mobile Equipment (Convention) and the Pro-
tocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile
Equipment on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment (Aircraft
Protocol) in 2001.12 After receiving the requisite number of rati-
fications, both entered into force in 2006. Singapore ratified
both the Convention and the Aircraft Protocol in 2009.13
The other two protocols dealing with railway rolling stock and
space assets, the Protocol to the Convention on International
Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Railway
Rolling Stock (Luxembourg Protocol) and the Protocol to the
Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on
Matters Specific to Space Assets (Space Protocol), were signed
in 2007 and 2012, respectively, but have yet to enter into force
and are outside the remit of this article.1 4
Acorn to Oak Tree]. The motive of "reducing borrowing costs" was later enshrined
as one of the five key objectives of the Convention and its protocols. See GOODE,
EXPLANATORY REPORT AND COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 2-3.
10 Goode, From Acorn to Oak Tree, supra note 9, at 605. See generally Aircraft Pro-
tocol, supra note 1; Luxembourg Protocol to the Convention on International
Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Railway Rolling Stock, Feb.
23, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 662 [hereinafter Luxembourg Protocol]; Protocol to the Con-
vention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to
Space Assets, Mar. 9, 2012 [hereinafter Space Protocol], available at http://www
.unidroit.org/instruments/security-interests/space-protocol.
n1 The Aviation Working Group is a not-for-profit legal entity comprised of
major aviation manufacturers, financiers, and leasing companies. AVIATION
WORKING GROUP, http://www.awg.aero/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2014).
12 Goode, From Acorn to Oak Tree, supra note 9, at 602-04.
13 Status-Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, UNIDROIT,
http://www.unidroit.org/status-2001capetown (last visited Nov. 9, 2014); Status-
Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Spe-
cific to Aircraft Equipment, UNIDROIT, http://www.unidroit.org/status-2001cape
town-aircraft (last visited Nov. 9, 2014).
14 See Luxembourg Protocol, supra note 10; Space Protocol, supra note 10; Sta-
tus-Luxembourg Protocol to the Convention on International Interest in Mobile Equip-
ment on Matters Specific to Railway Rolling Stock, UNIDROIT, www.unidroit.org/
status-2007luxembourg-rail (last visited Nov. 9, 2014); Status-Unidroit Protocol to
the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Space
Assets, UNIDROIT, www.unidroit.org/status-2012-space (last visited Nov. 9, 2014).
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The "hub-and-spoke" convention-protocol approach has pre-
viously been adopted in a few other conventions, but the Cape
Town Convention's use of protocols is unprecedented.1 5 The
Convention enters into force with respect to a particular state
only when that state has acceded to both the Convention and a
protocol, and the Convention will only enter into force for that
state with respect to the category of assets covered by the ac-
ceded protocol." Further, the Convention takes effect subject to
the provisions of the protocol, 7 with Article 6(1) stating that the
Convention and an individual protocol "shall be read and inter-
preted together as a single instrument" and Article 6(2) stating
that, with respect to a particular type of asset, the provisions of
the protocol relating to such asset will trump any inconsistent
provision contained in the Convention." This unique use of
protocols, which "ensure [s] that the Convention's provisions
can be adapted to the specific needs of particular sectors,"19 un-
derlines the importance of conceiving the legal regime gov-
erning security interests in aircraft equipment as a single set of
rules contained in the Convention and Aircraft Protocol.
The Convention and Aircraft Protocol established compre-
hensive creation, perfection, priority, and enforcement rules
governing aircraft equipment, while incorporating elements of
both secured transactions law and insolvency law 20 but the focus
of the article is on the perfection and priority rules, specifically
the first-to-register rule that grants a registered interest priority
over any other subsequently registered or unregistered interest.
The concept of a registration system with a first-to-register prior-
15 MarkJ. Sundahl, The "Cape Town Approach": A New Method of Making Interna-
tional Law, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 339, 354-58 (2006). Sundahl categorized
protocols prior to the Convention's protocols into (1) protocols of signature that
address detailed technical matters; (2) protocols of amendment used to modify
or change the provisions of the base convention; (3) optional protocols provid-
ing for obligations that supplement obligations contained in the base conven-
tion; and (4) framework protocols that provide substance to existing treaty
obligations. The Convention's protocols do not belong to any of these categories,
playing a primary role alongside the Convention instead of a mere supporting
role that the Convention can do without.
16 Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment art. 49, Nov. 16,
2001, 2307 U.N.T.S. 285 [hereinafter Cape Town Convention].
17 Roy Goode, The UNIDROIT Mobile Equipment Convention, in CROSS-BORDER
SECURITY AND INSOLVENCY 225, 231 (Michael Bridge & Robert Stevens eds. 2001)
[hereinafter Goode, The UNIDROIT Mobile Equipment Convention].
18 Cape Town Convention, supra note 16, art. 6.
19 Goode, The UNIDROIT Mobile Equipment Convention, supra note 17, at 231.
20 Deschamps, supra note 5, at 51-52.
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ity rule is not new; it is a key feature of Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC Article 9), which governs secured
transactions in all fifty states of the United States.2 ' Nevertheless,
the International Registry and first-to-register rule established by
the Convention and Aircraft Protocol pose unique problems
that do not arise in the context of domestic secured transactions
law,2 which ought to be carefully scrutinized and mitigated.
The single, restricted objective of this article is to rationalize
and defend the Convention and Aircraft Protocol's first-to-regis-
ter rule despite its problems, which this author believes have
been adequately considered by the drafters of the Convention
and Aircraft Protocol and addressed by the exceptions to the
rule.
Part II provides a basic overview of the relevant workings of
the Convention and Aircraft Protocol. Part III will distill the key
principles underlying the Convention and Aircraft Protocol's
first-to-register rule that justify its adoption upon a comprehen-
sive examination of the secured transactions law in several do-
mestic jurisdictions as well as international and regional efforts
at harmonization. Part IV will underline problems with the Con-
vention and Aircraft Protocol's first-to-register rule, and Part V
will show how the exceptions within the Convention and Air-
craft Protocol comprehensively address the problems. Singa-
pore's experience with the Convention and Aircraft Protocol
will be referred to as and when necessary to substantiate or illus-
trate arguments.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE CAPE TOWN CONVENTION
AND AIRCRAFT PROTOCOL
To summarize, the Convention and its protocols have three
main features: they (1) provide for the creation of an "interna-
tional interest" recognized in all contracting states; (2) establish
an international register for the registration of international in-
terests which will give notice of their existence to third parties
and enable creditors to preserve priority against subsequently
registered interests, unregistered interests, and insolvency ad-
ministrators; and (3) provide creditors with a range of basic de-
fault remedies and a means of obtaining speedy interim relief
pending final determination of its claim where there is evidence
21 Id. at 57-58.
22 See infra Part IV.
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of default.2" Because the focus of this article is on the first-to-
register rule, this Part will only elaborate at length with regard
to the first two features.
A. CREATION OF AN "INTERNATIONAL INTEREST"
At the heart of the Convention and its protocols is the con-
cept of an "international interest," a sui generis security interest
in mobile equipment that is "'autonomous' in the sense that it
neither derives from nor depends upon any . .. national law." 24
Its creation depends solely on compliance with the require-
ments of the Convention, which tells us that an "international
interest" is created by a security agreement, a title reservation
agreement, or a leasing agreement,25 so long as the agreement
creating or providing for the interest is in writing, "relates to an
object of which the [creator of the interest] has power to dis-
pose," and enables the object and secured obligations to be
identified. 6 While the international interest does not derive
from national law, "it is the applicable national law [that] deter-
mines whether the object is one of which the chargor, condi-
tional seller,2 7 or lessor has power to dispose."2
An international interest may concurrently constitute a secur-
ity interest under national law such that both will co-exist, but an
interest falling within Article 2 and constituted in accordance
with the formal requirements of Article 7 of the Convention is
an international interest enforceable between parties in any con-
tracting state regardless of whether it has any counterpart in na-
tional law or fulfills the requirements for creation of an interest
under national law.29 For example, a lease not made for security
purposes will not constitute a security interest in some jurisdic-
tions such as the United States where UCC Article 9 governs, but
23 GOODE, EXPLANATORY REPORT AND COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 2-3; see also
Roy GOODE, OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ON THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL IN-
TERESTS IN MOBILE EQUIPMENT AND PROTOCOL THERETO ON MATTERS SPECIFIC TO
AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT, 3 (2013) [hereinafter GOODE, OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ON
THE AIRCRAFT PROTOCOL] (for an in-depth analysis of the entire Convention and
Aircraft Protocol).
24 Wool, supra note 7, at 516; see also Roy Goode, The International Interest as an
Autonomous Property Interest, 12 EUR. REv. PRIVATE L. 18, 22, 24 (2004).
25 Cape Town Convention, supra note 16, art. 2(2).
26 Id. art. 7.
27 "A 'conditional seller' means a seller under a title reservation agreement."
Cape Town Convention, supra note 16, art. 1(f).
28 Goode, The UNIDROIT Mobile Equipment Convention, supra note 17, at 234.
29 Id.
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may nonetheless constitute an international interest under the
Convention.3 0 In any case, "creditor [s] will usually find it advan-
tageous to rely on the interest in its capacity of an international
interest," which normally "give [s them] stronger rights than
under national law."3 1
B. PERFECTION BY REGISTRATION IN AN
INTERNATIONAL REGISTRY
For an international interest to benefit from the priority rules
of the Convention and the Aircraft Protocol, it must be regis-
tered with the International Registry.
Given that the Convention is primarily concerned with con-
sensual security and quasi-security interests, it does not apply to
outright sales," and, consequently, the International Registry is
primarily a security registry. However, as will be elaborated on
later, the Aircraft Protocol extends the scope of the Convention
to encompass outright sales to secure for such sales the benefits
of the Convention's registration and priority rules. This does
not turn the International Registry into a title registry because
registration under the International Registry does not grant title
upon registration, but it does aid the International Registry's ef-
fectiveness as a security register that purports to reduce credit
risk.3 If a creditor cannot even be sure that the party seeking
credit is the owner of an aircraft object, he may be reluctant to
lend even if he is aware of security interests in the object.
The International Registry was established and supervised by
the ICAO, which assumed the functions of Supervisory Author-
ity provided by the Convention and Aircraft Protocol,35 but is
run by the Registrar, a separate entity from the Supervisory Au-
thority appointed by ICAO at regular five-year intervals.3 ' The
first-appointed and current Registrar is Aviareto Ltd., a joint
30 Deschamps, supra note 5, at 52.
31 Goode, The UNIDROIT Mobile Equipment Convention, supra note 17, at 234.
32 GOODE, EXPLANATORY REPORT AND COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 7.
3 Aircraft Protocol, supra note 1, art. III. See infra Part V(B) for more on out-
right sales.
3 Deschamps, supra note 5, at 62.
3 Cape Town Convention, supra note 16, art. 17; Aircraft Protocol, supra note
1, art. XVII; see also GOODE, OmFICIAL COMMENTARY ON THE AIRCRAFr PROTOCOL,
supra note 23, at 343-44.
36 Cape Town Convention, supra note 16, art. 17(2); Aircraft Protocol, supra
note 1, art. XVII(5).
754 [ 79
FIRST-TO-REGISTER RULE
venture between SITA SC3 7 and the Irish government, which op-
erates out of Dublin, Ireland."
"Registration is against the individual [aircraft] object, not
against the debtor," which explains "the requirement that the
object must be uniquely identifiable" in order for an interna-
tional interest to be created." Airframes and engines are treated
separately; hence, where a single transaction providing for a reg-
istrable interest in an airframe and attached engines is involved,
separate registrations are needed for the airframe and each of
the engines. 0
For registration of an interest or prospective interest-ad-
vanced filing is hence permitted-in an aircraft object to be ef-
fected, basic information about a transaction or prospective
transaction must be transmitted to the International Registry, 4 1
and the information must be entered into the International
Registry's database so as to be searchable.4 2
Registration is "notice-based" 3 and the Registrar is not ex-
pected to review filings to assess their legal adequacy or investi-
gate who is making the submission.44 "[T]he Registrar is only
liable for loss suffered directly resulting from an error or omis-
sion of the Registrar or from a malfunction of its system except
where the malfunction is due to a force majeure event or could
not have been prevented by using current best practices.""
A number of contracting states have designated an exclusive
national entry point for accessing the International Registry for
the purpose of harmonizing national registration systems with
3 An air transport global information and telecommunication service pro-
vider. SITA, http://www.sita.aero/about-sita (last visited Nov. 1, 2014).
38 Ronald C.C. Cuming, The International Registry for Interests in Aircraft: An Over-
view of its Structure, 11 UNIFORM L. REV. 18, 26 (2006).
39 GOODE, EXPLANATORY REPORT AND COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 6.
40 Id. at 22.
41 Id. at 26.
42 Id.; Cape Town Convention, supra note 16, art. 19(2).
43 Id. art. 17(2) (i).
44 Jane K. Winn, The Cape Town Convention's International Registry: Decoding the
Secrets of Success in Global Electronic Commerce, 1 CAPE TowN CONVENTION J. 25, 40
(2012).
45 Cape Town Convention, supra note 16, art. 28(1).
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the International Registry,4 6 but most states have not, permitting
registrations directly with the International Registry.4 7
Electronic and accessible online on a 24/7 basis "unless it is
unavailable due to maintenance or unforeseen circum-
stances,"48 the International Registry provides notice to the
world of the existence or potential existence of registrable inter-
ests affecting aircraft objects, but it must be emphasized that the
priority of a registered interest is not dependent on the state of
knowledge of third parties. 9
C. ARTICLE 29 (1) 'S BRIGHT-LINE FIRST-TO-REGISTER RULE
The basic priority rule of the Convention, as enshrined in Ar-
ticle 29(1), is that "a registered interest has priority over any
other interest subsequently registered and over an unregistered
interest."5 0 "Registered" means registered in the International
Registry.51 "Registered interest" means a registered international
interest,52 a non-consensual right or interest (NCRI)53 registra-
ble or registered under Article 40 of the Convention,5 4 or a reg-
istered national interest 55 specified in a notice of a national
interest. 6
Sequence of registration merely determines priority.5 ' As ob-
served by Wool, it is "not an aspect of, or a condition to, the
creation or validity of that interest or its enforceability. Thus, if
an interest has not been validly created [,] . . . or if the factual
predicate to that interest is false, the act of registration will not
rectify such defects." 8
46 For example, in the United States, a transaction party must first register the
aircraft object with the Federal Aviation Administration in order to receive a
transaction code that can then be used to register the aircraft object with the
International Registry. Winn, supra note 44, at 40-41.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 40.
49 Cuming, supra note 38, at 28.
50 Cape Town Convention, supra note 16, art. 29(1).
51 Id. art. 1(bb).
52 Id. art. 1 (cc).
53 See infra Part V(E) for more on NCRIs, i.e., non-consensual rights or
interests.
54 Cape Town Convention, supra note 16, arts. 1(cc), 1(dd).
55 According to Article 1(r) of the Cape Town Convention, a "national inter-
est" is an interest held by a creditor in an object and created by an international
transaction covered by a declaration under Article 50(1). Id. art. 1(r).
56 Id. arts. 1(cc), 1(dd).




Article 29(1) embodies a bright-line first-to-register rule that
gives priority to a registered interest over an unregistered inter-
est, regardless of whether it is capable of being registered,5 9
even if the holder of a registered interest had knowledge of an
earlier unregistered interest and even as regards value given
with such knowledge.6 0
The granting of priority without taking into account the state
of knowledge of the registrant follows the approach taken by
UCC Article 9.61 Article 29(1)'s rejection of a doctrine of notice,
constructive or otherwise, also has a counterpart in the English
company charges registration system6 2 in which "most mort-
gage[s] or charge[s] created by a company are void against a
liquidator, administrator, or creditor of the company ... unless
they are registered against the debtor at Companies House
within the prescribed period."" However, there are important
differences between the two registration systems, key of which is
the type of priority that they grant. UCC Article 9's first-to-regis-
ter rule grants positive priority whereby priority is determined
by sequence of registration, whereas the English Companies
Act's registration requirements grant negative priority whereby
priority depends on sequence of creation but registration is nec-
essary to protect that priority."4 Thus, the Convention's registra-
tion system more closely resembles UCC Article 9 's registration
system.
III. DISTILLING KEY PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING ARTICLE
29(1)'S BRIGHT-LINE FIRST-TO-REGISTER RULE
As mentioned above, the predominant influence behind the
Convention and Aircraft Protocol's International Registry and
bright-line first-to-register rule is UCC Article 9, which was al-
most wholly adopted in many Canadian provinces and precipi-
tated reform legislation in many other jurisdictions such as
59 Cape Town Convention, supra note 16, art. 1(mm).
60 Id. art. 29(2).
61 Deschamps, supra note 5, at 58.
62 See In re Monolithic Building Co. [1915] 1 Ch. 643 (A.C.).
63 Richard Calnan, Taking Security in England, in CROSS-BORDER SECURIY AND
INSOLVENCY 17, 29 (Michael Bridge & Robert Stevens eds., 2001).
6 For more on the differences between the UCC and English registration sys-
tems, see Chapter 4 of GERARD MCCORMACK, SECURED CREDIT AND THE
HARmONISATION OF LAw (2011).
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Mexico. 5 Across the Atlantic, many European jurisdictions also
have registration systems for security rights in tangibles, with a
couple of notable exceptions being Germany and the Nether-
lands.6 6 But they differ greatly from UCC Article 9 in terms of
purpose, coverage, and efficiency. 7 This can perhaps be attrib-
uted to the fact that the "notion of publicity with respect to se-
curity rights in movables has had varying acceptance in Europe,
being generally rejected in Germany and playing a limited but
significant role in [countries like] Belgium and France and a
substantial role in [countries like] Norway. "68
Apart from its impact on domestic secured transactions laws,
UCC Article 9 also formed the basis of other efforts toward in-
ternational and regional harmonization, such as the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development Model Law on Se-
cured Transactions (EBRD Model Law) and the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law Legislative Guide on
Secured Transactions (UNCITRAL Legislative Guide)."' Of
note, for the purposes of this article, is the EBRD Model Law
principle that the existence of a security right over property
must be effectively publicized7 ' and the UNCITRAL Legislative
Guide's recommendation of the implementation of a UCC Arti-
cle 9-inspired registry and first-to-register rule,7 1 which was re-
cently followed up with the UNCITRAL Guide on the
Implementation of a Security Rights Registry. 2
65 Harry C. Sigman, Security in Movables in the United States-Uniform Commercial
Code Article 9: A Basis for Comparison, in SECURITY RIGHTS IN MOVABLE PROPERTY IN
EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAw 54, 54 (Eva-Maria Kieninger ed. 2004).
66 As observed in Eva-Maria Kieninger & Harry C. Sigman, Introduction, in
CROSS-BORDER SECURITY OVER TANGIBLES 1, 8 (Eva-Maria Kieninger & Harry C.
Sigman eds., 2007), submission to the tax authority of a copy of a non-authentic
deed of pledge with respect to an "undisclosed" pledge is required in the Nether-
lands. However, this cannot be viewed as "registration" as used in this article be-
cause such submission is not to a searchable public record and is merely a device
to provide a date certain as an alternative to use of an authentic deed.
67 Id.
68 Sigman, supra note 65, at 59; see infra Part 11(a) (for more on the concept of
publicity).
69 See ULRICH DROBNIG & HENK J. SNIJDERS, DIVERGENCES OF PROPERTY LAw, AN
OBSTACLE TO THE INTERNAL MARKET? 7, 212 (Erik-Jan Zippro ed., 2006).
70 Id. at 212-13.
71 Joshua T. Klein, UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions: An Intro-
duction and Overview, Fox ROTHSCHILD LLP (July 2009), http://www.foxroths
child.com/newspubs/newspubsArticle.aspx?id=1 1086.
72 U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL GUIDE ON THE IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF A SECURITY RIGHTS REGISTRY, U.N. Sales No. E.14.V.6 (2014).
758 [ 79
FIRST-TO-REGISTER RULE
What are the key principles underlying the UCC Article 9-in-
spired, positive priority-granting bright-line first-to-register rule
found in various domestic, regional, and international secured
transactions laws and in Article 29(1) of the Convention? As in-
dicated in Part I, the controlling purpose of the Convention and
Aircraft Protocol is the facilitation of access to low-cost credit by
reducing credit risk.7 3 Article 29(1)'s bright-line first-to-register
rule furthers this purpose by increasing transparency, making
the law more certain, improving efficiency, and allocating risk to
parties best able to mitigate it. Furthermore, it is compatible
with aviation finance where non-possessory security interests are
taken over highly mobile equipment.
A. TRANSPARENCY THROUGH PUBLICITY
A significant benefit of registration-based priority rules like a
first-to-register rule accompanied by a public register, regardless
of the form of the registry and the type of priority it grants, is
that it increases transparency of security interests, which is one
of the Convention's five underlying principles." A registration
system has therefore been viewed as a "substitute for disposses-
sion of a pledgor" in serving the publicity function of warning
creditors to inquire further before extending credit. 75 Rules that
grant priority, both positive and negative, ensure the complete-
ness of the register by making parties take their registration obli-
gations seriously.
Transparency through publicity reduces the possibility of
fraud on creditors and, as a result, mitigates credit risk.7 6 With-
out a public register that "suffices to warn that a creditor may,
presently or thereafter, claim a security interest"77 in the rele-
vant object, "[unsecured] creditors may be misled by want of
registration into extending credit which they would not other-
wise have granted."7 8 In the context of Singapore's negative pri-
ority-granting company charges registration system, which is
based on the English system, it has been said that "[tihe enact-
ment of a public register of charges was intended to protect [un-
7 GOODE, EXPLANATORY REPORT AND COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 2.
74 Id. at 3.
75 Kieninger & Sigman, supra note 66, at 40.
76 Id.
7 Sigman, supra note 65, at 59.
78 Roy GOODE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAw 13-124 (2011).
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secured] creditors from losing priority to undisclosed
proprietary interests created by way of security."7
B. LEGAL CERTAINTY AND PREDICTABILITY
A bright-line first-to-register rule "establishes an objective
marker, a date [i.e., the date that a registration is made] cer-
tainly not subject to private manipulation, which can be, and in
most cases is, used as a priority determinant."8 0
In eliminating "the use of subjective knowledge standards
[that] would invite factual disputes and unnecessarily increase
litigation-related costs and risks,"8 ' the bright-line first-to-regis-
ter rule is a "clear and concise priority rule" that reflects another
of the Convention's underlying principles-"predictability in
the application of the Convention," which emphasises "certainty
and simplicity and a rule-based rather than standards-based ap-
proach."8 2 When creditors can rest assured that they will not
"unwittingly and unfairly lose their legitimate rights ... due to
the peculiarities or inadequacies of local law. ,"83 they will be
more willing to extend credit-and at a lower cost.
Transactions that will benefit from increased levels of legal
predictability are not confined to transactions for initial acquisi-
tion of new aircraft equipment." "Capacity adjustment" transac-
tions such as leasing and selling used aircraft equipment that
primarily affect short-term and medium-term capacity require-
ments of airlines will also benefit.85 The growth of airline alli-
ances and the accompanying increased use of code-sharing
arrangements highlight the importance of facilitating such ca-
pacity adjustments." This is true for Singapore Airlines, which
has code-sharing agreements with several airlines, mainly mem-
bers of the Star Alliance.
79 Media Dev. Auth. of Sing. v. Sculptor Fin. (MD) Ireland Ltd [2013] SGCA
58 at [30] (quoting WILLIAM J. GOUGH, COMPANY CHARGEs 453, 736 (2011)).
80 Sigman, supra note 65, at 59.
81 Wool, supra note 7, at 535.
82 GOODE, EXPLANATORY REPORT AND COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 3.
83 Arundell & Wilson, supra note 3, at 285-86.
84 David Clancy & Gregory Voss, Facilitating Asset-Based Financing and Leasing of
Aircraft Equipment Through the Proposed UNIDROIT Convention: Manufacturer's Per-
spective, 23 AIR & SPACE L. 287, 288 (1998).
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Codeshare Partners of Singapore Airlines, SING. AIRLINES, https://www.singapore
air.com/enUK/about-us/psh-codeshare-psh/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2014).
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C. EFFICIENCY
In general, improved efficiency within a secured transactions
legal framework translates to lower credit cost. A bright-line
first-to-register rule improves efficiency by reducing investiga-
tion costs for creditors (i.e., the costs of investigating a potential
debtor's affairs to ensure that the potential debtor is credit-wor-
thy)." These cost savings cannot be underestimated in the con-
text of cross-border secured transactions. As observed by Wool,
"the opposite rule-unregisterable interests prevailing over reg-
istered international interests-would require the holder of an
international interest to search for all categories of potential in-
terests in all relevant jurisdictions."" This provides a stark con-
trast to a simple search on the International Registry, which, like
Article 9's registry, is "publicly and inexpensively accessible."90
At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that "[t]he primary
sources of information for a prospective extender of commer-
cial credit are the debtor's loan application and the debtor's
books and records . . . supplemented, as appropriate, by infor-
mation obtained directly from other creditors and other public
or private sources of credit information."91 Hence, investigation
costs savings are derived mainly from easier and cheaper credit
information verification instead of credit information gathering.
Efficiency is also enhanced in allowing creditors to protect
their security interests at a lower cost. Rather than taking steps
to protect their interests in all relevant jurisdictions, which can
be time-consuming and expensive, a creditor only needs to pre-
pare information once and register it with one registry. Follow-
ing the approach taken by UCC Article 9, both the International
Registry's substantive information and procedural requirements
are not so extensive and onerous so as to entail significant costs
and delays."
Electronic registration and searching "allows the registry to be
operated with virtually no personnel and at virtually no cost, and
allows filing and searching to be accomplished on a virtually
88 Wool, supra note 7, at 535.
89 Id.
9o Sigman, supra note 65, at 59.
91 Kieninger & Sigman, supra note 66, at 42.
92 See Int'l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Regulations and Procedures for the Interna-
tional Registry, at § 5, ICAO Doc. 9864 (5th ed. 2013) (providing substantive infor-
mation and procedural requirements).
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real-time basis; minimum human intervention also serves to
minimize the risk of human error."9 3
D. ALLOCATION OF RISK TO PARTIES BEST ABLE
TO MITIGATE RISK
A bright-line first-to-register rule punishes a creditor who fails
to register by granting a subsequent creditor priority even if the
latter knew of the former's interest. It therefore serves as a "pow-
erful inducement"9 4 to creditors to (1) "structure their transac-
tion in a manner that fits within the legal framework,"" and (2)
comply with the registration requirements in order to reap the
full benefits that registration accords and reduce their priority
risk."6
Alternatively, a creditor may decide that withholding funds
may be the best option to mitigate priority risk after a thorough
examination of a credit application. In this regard, a bright-line
first-to-register rule "supports due diligence on the part of a pro-
spective supplier of credit, as it serves efficiently to assist in the
discovery of potentially competing security interest."97
Therefore, even though the Convention and Aircraft Proto-
col's registration system does not remove all credit risk, credi-
tors are well-placed to take necessary measures to mitigate the
risk by using mechanisms within the system.
E. COMPATIBILITY WITH AVIATION FINANCE
It has been argued that the bright-line first-to-register rule in
UCC Article 9 was designed more with tangible goods in mind
rather than receivables because the transparency, predictability,
and efficiency benefits attached to the rule are far more signifi-
cant when the rule is applied to tangibles.98 The rule therefore
93 Kieninger & Sigman, supra note 66, at 48.
94 GOODE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAw, supra note 78, at
608-09.
95 Wool, supra note 7, at 535.
96 See id. at 516; GOODE, EXPLANATORY REPORT AND COMMENTARY, supra note 3,
at 36.
97 Kieninger & Sigman, supra note 66, at 42.
98 See, e.g., Thomas E. Plank, Assignment of Receivables Under Article 9: Structural
Incoherence and Wasteful Filing, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 231, 267 (2007) (arguing that in
the context of receivables, registration provides no meaningful information to
subsequent searchers in many cases, and in other cases any minimum informa-
tional benefits for some subsequent searchers do not outweigh the costs imposed
by the registration requirement. This is because receivables "only exist because
there is a third person, the obligor to whom a loan was made (either cash, prop-
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naturally lends itself to the subject of the Convention-security
measures taken for mobile assets.
Moreover, these benefits are magnified when the equipment
is high-value mobile equipment that moves frequently across na-
tional borders." As Davies observed, "[t]he availability of re-
course to asset-based security is especially important to the
aviation industry not least because of the strong residual value of
an aircraft but also the length of time involved in the financing
of it as well as the amounts lent. .. ."100 Enforcing non-posses-
sory security rights against aircraft equipment becomes "some-
thing of a lottery" if the priority rules are not standardized
across countries given the mobility and internationality of air-
craft equipment. 1  The bright-line first-to-register rule is thus
highly compatible to aviation finance.10 2
IV. IDENTIFYING PROBLEMS WITH ARTICLE 29(1)'S
BRIGHT-LINE FIRST-TO-REGISTER RULE
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned principles, injustifying
the adoption of the Convention and Aircraft Protocol's bright-
line first-to-register rule, some have pointed toward the costs of
establishing, maintaining, and using a registry;30s monopoly
profits earned by first-registered creditors;IO4 time zone
problems;'0 5 and the inequitable treatment of non-registrable
interests in opposing the rule. 10 6 Of these concerns, the focus of
erty, or services provided to the obligor) and from whom payment is owed." The
owner of a receivable must account for the cash, property, or services provided,
and if the obligor makes payments on the receivable to the owner, the owner
must account for such payments. These cash flows are therefore a reliable and
sufficient source of information for subsequent purchasers and creditors).
99 Iwan Davies, The New Lex Mercatoria: International Interests in Mobile Equipment,
52 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 151, 165 (2003).
100 Id.
101 Stephen J. McGail, The Proposed UNIDROIT Convention: International Law for
Asset Finance (Aircraft), 4 UNIFORM L. REV. 439, 440 (1999).
102 Practicality is another of the Convention's five underlying principles. See
GOODE, EXPLANATORY REPORT AND COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 3.
103 R. Randall Padfield, Cape Town Rules Still Causing Headaches, NBAA CONVEN-
TION NEWS (Nov. 13, 2006, 6:07 AM), http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/
nbaa-convention-news/2006-11-13/cape-town-still-causing-headaches.
104 Kieninger & Sigman, supra note 66, at 47.
105 Berend J.H. Crans, The UNDROIT on International Interests in Mobile Equip-
ment and the Aircraft Equipment Protocol: Some Critical Observations, 23 AIR & SPACE L.
277, 282 (1998).
106 See Wool, supra note 7, at 535 (addressing those opposed to the Convention
and Aircarft Protocol's bright-line first-to-register rule on the basis of inequitable
treatment of non-registrable interests).
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this Part will be the last two, which are unique to the Conven-
tion's first-to-register rule because it is applied to international
interests and not domestic interests. The first two concerns are
common criticisms leveled at first-to-register rules even within
the context of domestic secured transactions law, which, in the
opinion of this author, are non-concerns that should be categor-
ically dismissed.
A. CosTs OF ESTABLISHING, MAINTAINING,
AND USING A REGISTRY
It has been argued that it is expensive to establish and main-
tain a register because of the costs incurred in performing
searches and preparing registrations.1 0 7 However, experience
has demonstrated that the costs of establishing an electronic no-
tice filing registration system are low, that costs of operating
such a system are low and covered by minimal registration fees,
and that the costs incurred in performing searches and registra-
tions are typically only a small fraction of the due diligence and
documentation costs routinely incurred in secured credit
transactions. 108
In addition, there are concrete checks on cost in place for the
International Registry.10 Article XX(3) of the Aircraft Protocol
mandates that it operates on a cost-recovery basis and ICAO, the
Supervisory Authority, "sets and reviews its fees, taking into ac-
count" its operating costs and potential liability.11 As of the writ-
ing of this article, the charge for a priority search fee is $22 and
the cost of setting up an account and making a registration is a
paltry $380.111 These costs are surely far outweighed by the costs
of performing due diligence without a registration system in
place.112
B. MONOPOLY PROFITS
It has also been asserted that the first-to-register rule unac-
companied by a maximum amount requirement gives the first-
107 Padfield, supra note 103.
108 Kieninger & Sigman, supra note 66, at 48.
109 See Winn, supra note 44, at 40.
110 Id.
'" FAQ INT'L REGISTRY MOBILE AsSETS, http://vw.internationalregistry.aero
(last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
12 See Plank, supra note 98, at 257-58 (discussing the lack of information avail-




registered creditor an unacceptable monopoly position." 3 Ac-
cording to this line of reasoning, the first-to-register rule forces
a debtor who had previously given registered security over an
object to obtain additional credit from the first-registered credi-
tor, who is able to charge an exorbitant rate because other credi-
tors are reluctant to lend when their interests rank behind the
first-registered interest in the priority queue.1 1 4 This allows first-
registered creditors to earn monopoly profits that drive up the
cost of credit, and brings about overly exclusive relationships be-
tween creditors and debtors that stifle competition within the
aviation finance market. Presumably persuaded by the above
line of reasoning, the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide suggests the
adoption of a maximum amount requirement should a state de-
termine that it is helpful to facilitate subordinate lending. 15
However, this concern is also highly overstated. As reasoned
by Sigman and Kieninger, a willing new creditor can pay off the
first-registered creditor when there is active competition among
sources of credit."' The first-registered creditor would also,
more often than not, be the best source for additional credit
because it is already familiar with the debtor, allowing it to save
on investigation costs that would be incurred by a new credi-
tor.'1 7 Furthermore, the creditor would likely be eager to extend
additional credit at competitive rates to a good customer in or-
der to maintain the relationship."' When a debtor's credit-wor-
thiness is in question, first-registered creditors have even been
known to refuse to extend fresh credit altogether and volunta-
rily enter into subordination agreements with subsequent
creditors."'
113 Kieninger & Sigman, supra note 66, at 47.
114 Id. at 46.
115 U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAw, UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SE-
CURED TRANSACTIONS, at 98, U.N. Sales No. E.09.V.12 (2010).
1n6 Kieninger & Sigman, supra note 66, at 47.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 NAT'L LAw CTR., Secured Financing for Mobile Equipment: The Proposed Protocol
on Mining, Agriculture and Construction Equipment 14, UNIDROIT (Mar. 5, 2014),
http://www.unidroit.org/english/governments/councildocuments/2014ses
sion/nlcift-e.pdf ("The Cape Town Convention affords some level of flexibility to
the creditors to vary their respective priorities by an agreement. Subordination
that results from a modification of the priority between the parties may also be
registered in the International Registry.").
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C. TIME ZONES
Before the Convention and Aircraft Protocol entered into
force, there were concerns that a first-to-register rule would give
an undue advantage to parties in the same time zone as the In-
ternational Registry because information transmitted to the In-
ternational Registry needs to be entered into its database before
registration is deemed effective.12 0
This concern proved to be groundless because the Interna-
tional Registry, modeled after the most advanced modern elec-
tronic registries for security interests, allows registration data to
be transmitted directly to the database "[o]nce authority to ac-
cess the [International Registry] and the requisite consents have
been obtained."1 21 Registry staff members are not administra-
tively involved in the entry or amendment of registration data in
the database or in the discharge of a registration.12 2 Given that
the International Registry is electronic and accessible on a 24/7
basis, creditors all over the world are placed on equal footing
with respect to their ability to protect their interests under the
Convention and Aircraft Protocol.
This ability will soon be enhanced by the introduction of an
updated International Registry website, which will change the
registration process from one where registrations submitted for
entry into the database become effective on "an object-by-object
and registration-by-registration basis," to a transactional system
of registration where submission for registrations by a user may
be made in multiples, either with only one common registration
to be effected for multiple aircraft objects or with multiple regis-
trations to be made on one aircraft object.' 23 ICAO has ap-
proved a new regulation-Section 5.18 of the Sixth Edition of
the Regulations and Procedures for the International Registry-
that allows for the establishment of a "closing room,"124 an elec-
tronic folder separate from the database that allows users "to
assemble all of the information and consents required to effect
one or more registrations against one or more aircraft objects,
and to establish the chronological order in which such registra-
120 Crans, supra note 105, at 282.
121 Cuming, supra note 38, at 54.
122 Id.
123 William B. Piels & Tan Siew Huay, Generation II of the International Registry
Website The Closing Room: A Transactional Approach to Registrations, 1 CAPE TowN
CONVENTION J. 165, 167 (2013).
124 Id. at 166-67.
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tions should take effect, all prior to the release of such registra-
tions into the International Registry data base." 125
Parties, regardless of where they are located, will henceforth
not only be able to effect registrations anytime, but also ensure
that all multiple interests in one or more aircraft objects have
the same time stamp and same priority status for purposes of the
first-to-register rule.
D. SUBORDINATION OF NON-REGISTRABLE INTERESTS TO
REGISTERED INTERESTS: CLASH BETWEEN PURELY
NATIONAL INTERESTS AND INTERNATIONALLY-
RECOGNIZED INTERESTS
Last but not least, it has been argued that it is inequitable that
holders of interests over aircraft equipment that are not registra-
ble under the Convention but registrable under national law
lose their national law priority to subsequent registered inter-
ests.12 6 The clash here is not between national interests and in-
ternational interests as defined narrowly in Article 2(2) of the
Convention. Instead, it is between non-registrable, purely na-
tional interests and registrable international interests defined
broadly to encompass Article 2(2) international interests and
national interests recognized by the Convention and Aircraft
Protocol, such as declared NCRIs1 27 and interests covered by
declarations made under Article 50(1) .128 To avoid confusion,
this broad definition of international interests shall be termed
"internationally recognized interests."
To the above argument, Jeffrey Wool, Secretary General of
the AWG and expert consultant to UNIDROIT on international
aviation finance matters, made three counter-arguments.129 He
argued that (1) "the definition of an international interest, to-
gether with a contract of sale, is sufficiently broad to pick up all
customary types of transactions involving the financing and leas-
ing of aircraft objects;" (2) "transaction parties, being aware of
the Convention/Aircraft Protocol . . . can simply structure their
125 Id. at 168.
126 See Roy Goode, The Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile
Equipment: A Driving Force for International Asset-Based Financing, 7 UNIFORM L. REV.
1, 12 (2002) (addressing the concerns regarding internal or seemingly pure na-
tional interests).
127 See infra Part V(E) (for more on NCRIs, i.e., non-consensual rights or
interests).
128 Cape Town Convention, supra note 16, art. 50(1).
129 Wool, supra note 7, at 535.
7672014]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
transactions in a manner that fits within the legal framework;"
and (3) allowing non-registrable interests to prevail over regis-
tered international interests would result in unjustifiably high
investigation costs because a priority search will have to be done
in all relevant jurisdictions."
These are all valid counter-arguments, but the fact that Wool
relied on presumptive assertions and countervailing policy con-
siderations demonstrates that this concern, unlike the other
three, has not been satisfactorily refuted by empirical observa-
tions or negated by technology.
V. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS: EXCEPTIONS
TO ARTICLE 29(1)'S BRIGHT-LINE
FIRST-TO-REGISTER RULE
Part IV established that Article 29(1)'s bright-line first-to-regis-
ter rule's subordination of non-registrable interests to registered
interests is problematic from an equity point of view, but it is
important to recognize that the rule is not a standalone rule.'3 '
The Convention and Aircraft Protocol's priority regime consti-
tutes not just Article 29(1)'s first-to-register rule but also several
exceptions to the rule.13 2 The question is, therefore, whether
the numerous exceptions laid out within the Convention and
Aircraft Protocol adequately address this outstanding concern
regarding inequitable treatment of non-registrable interests.3
A. PROCEEDS
An interest in proceeds is not independently registrable
under the Convention, but an international interest in an air-
craft object extends to proceeds, 1 3 and any priority granted by
Article 29(1) to an interest in an object extends to proceeds, 13
with "proceeds" being confined by definition to "money or non-
money proceeds arising from the total or partial loss or physical
destruction of the object or its total or partial confiscation, con-
demnation, or requisition."'3 6 Insurance proceeds are an exam-
130 Id.
131 See Roy Goode, The Priority Rules Under the Cape Town Convention and Proto-
cols, 1 CAPE TowN CONVENTION J. 95 (2012) [hereinafter Goode, The Priority
Rules] (examining all exceptions to the rule).
132 Id.
133 For a detailed examination of every single exception, see id.
13 Cape Town Convention, supra note 16, art. 2(5).
135 Id. art. 29(6).
136 Id. art. 1(w).
768 [ 79
FIRST-TO-REGISTER RULE
ple of such proceeds.1 3 7 If successive international interests in an
aircraft object insured against loss or damage are registered, the
first-registered creditor will have the first claim on insurance
proceeds ahead of later-registered creditors. 13
Article 29(6) extends the coverage of Article 29(1)'s first-to-
register rule to non-registrable competing claims to proceeds
only when both claims are derived from international interests
in the object whose loss or compulsory acquisition gives rise to
the proceeds.1 3 1 It does not determine priority between compet-
ing claims to proceeds when one of the claimants does not have
an international interest in the object and bases his claim on a
national security interest, such as when proceeds are claimed as
proceeds of debts purchased by or charged to a receivables
financier. 4 0
The narrow definition of "proceeds" seemingly gives sub-
stance to the concern that non-registrable interests are being
unfairly subordinated to international interests, but a review of
the Convention's drafting process reveals that it was not a draft-
ing oversight but an intentional move backed by solid counter-
vailing reasons."'
Given that registration under the Convention "is against the
individual object, not against the debtor,"14 2 proceeds must be
uniquely identifiable in the hands of the debtor just like an ob-
ject in order for an international interest to be registrable
against them.14 3 Only insurance and loss-related proceeds fit the
bill.'4 4 General proceeds such as receivables arising from a sale
of an object subject to a Convention international interest are
difficult to isolate once they leave the debtor's hands or become
commingled with the debtor's other assets, and it is arguable
that tracing should be left to domestic law rather than a highly
specialized international instrument focused on specific types of




141 Id. at 108; see also Mark J. Sundahl, International Secured Transactions and In-
solvency, 40 INT'L LAW. 381, 390 (2006) (comparing the broad definition of "pro-
ceeds" in Article 9 of the UCC to the narrow definition in the Convention).
142 GOODE, EXPLANATORY REPORT AND COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 6.
143 Roy GOODE, CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN MOBILE EQUIP-
MENT AND DRAFr PROTOCOL THERETO ON MATTERS SPECIFIC TO SPACE ASSETS: Ex-
PLANATORY NOTE 10 (July 2011).
144 Id.
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mobile assets."' Allowing registration of general proceeds
would broaden the Convention and its protocols' "scope beyond
aircraft objects, railway rolling stock and space property.""'
The essential point is that "the Convention and its [p] rotocols
are concerned with security and quasi-security interests in, and
sales of, physical, uniquely identifiable assets, and with rights to
payment or other performance linked to registered interna-
tional interests and sales, not with general receivables financ-
ing," which the drafters of the Convention and the protocols
were keen to leave to a later convention-the 2001 United Na-
tions Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in Interna-
tional Trade.14 7
B. OUTRIGHT SALES
Outright sales are not registrable under the Convention, but
it was considered necessary to give special protection to a buyer
who takes before registration of an international interest be-
cause outright sales are common transactions. 1 4 8 Article 29(3) of
the Convention therefore excludes an outright buyer from the
first-to-register rule, allowing it to acquire its interests free from
an unregistered interest even if it had notice of it.14 9
However, Article III of the Aircraft Protocol made Article
29(3) of the Convention redundant by extending the registra-
tion and priority rules of the Convention to outright sales so
that Article 29(1) gives a registered sale priority over (1) subse-
quently registered or unregistered international interests and
registrable NCRIs; (2) non-registrable NCRIs not protected by a
declaration under Article 39; (3) non-registrable interests; and
(4) subsequently registered or unregistered national interest
notices. 5 o
In addition, "Article X1V(1) of the Aircraft Protocol provides
the same priority rule for competing sales by the same seller as
does Article 29(1) of the Convention for competing interna-
tional interests" and follows Article 29(2) of the Convention in
making it clear that knowledge of a prior unregistered interest
145 Id. ("Whether proceeds which have left the debtor's hands or have become
commingled with other assets of the debtor remain traceable is answered not by
the Convention but by the applicable law.").
146 GOODE, EXPLANATORY REPORT AND COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 20.
147 Goode, The Priority Rules, supra note 131, at 108.
148 Id. at 98.
149 Cape Town Convention, supra note 16, art. 29(3).
150 Goode, The Priority Rules, supra note 131, at 101.
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does not affect priority. 15 1 To illustrate, if S sells an aircraft ob-
ject to A, who registers the sale in the International Registry and
then wrongfully sells the same object to B, A retains its interest
free of B.15 2 If B registers before A even if he had knowledge of
the unregistered sale to A, B has priority.15 3 Article XIV(1) does
not apply to successive sales, which is where S sells to A, who
subsequently sells to B, because there is no priority issue-the
buyers are not in competition with each other.1 5 1
Assuming every sale is registered to protect against fraudulent
sales, nothing turns on the order of registrations, and in this
sense, the International Registry is not a title registry that grants
title upon registration.1 5 Nevertheless, the combined effect of
Articles III and XIV of the Aircraft Protocol is first, to enable
outright buyers to take advantage of the registration system to
protect their interests and safeguard themselves against fraudu-
lent sales,15 6 and second, to allow prospective creditors to safe-
guard themselves against debtor fraud where a party purports to
grant a security interest over an object not actually owned by
him because, presumably, the last registration of sale will indi-
cate the current title-holder.'5 7 It is for these reasons that the
Space Protoco 1 5 s followed the Aircraft Protocol's lead in mak-
ing the same extension to outright sales of space assets and the
Rail Working Group proposed that the Luxembourg Protocol
do the same for outright sales of railway rolling stock.15 9
Outright sales hence represent a unique category of transac-
tions where the clash between non-registrable interests and reg-
istered interests is resolved by making some non-registrable
interests registrable.
C. CONDITIONAL BUYERS AND LESSEES
Conditional buyers 1o and lessees, who are. the debtors grant-






156 Aircraft Protocol, supra note 1, art. III.
157 Id. art. XIV.
158 Space Protocol, supra note 10, art. IV.
159 RAIL WORKING GRP., PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE CONTRACTS OF SALE IN THE
DRArr RAIL PROTOCOL (Feb. 2007).
160 See Cape Town Convention, supra note 16, art. 1(e) (meaning "a buyer
under title reservation agreement").
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under the Convention; instead Article 29(4) of the Convention
allows them to rely on any priority enjoyed by their creditors-
the conditional sellers and lessors-against a third-party claim-
ant."6 ' For instance, if a lessor grants a lease of an airframe, reg-
isters its interest under the Convention, and then charges the
airframe to a third-party creditor who registers the charge under
the Convention, the lessee takes free from the chargee's interest
because the interest of the lessor was registered before that of
the charge even if the lessee was unable to register its interest.16 2
The Aircraft Protocol buttresses the protection accorded to
conditional buyers or lessees by giving them a right of quiet
enjoyment.16 3
D. EXCLUSION OF THE DOCTRINE OF ACCESSION
The Convention governs airframes, aircraft engines, and heli-
copters, and only rights in these aircraft equipment are registra-
ble under the Convention.164 This raises the question of what
happens to creditor rights in items like computers, which are
installed into aircraft equipment. A doctrine of accession by
which ownership of an object that becomes incorporated in a
larger object passes to the owner of the principal object exists in
some legal systems, but Article 29(7) makes it clear that the Con-
vention does not recognize such a doctrine.'6 5
Article 29(7) leaves ownership or other rights in installed
items to be dealt with by the applicable law.1 66 If under the ap-
plicable law the rights in an item held prior to its installation
continue to exist after installation, a holder of a registered inter-
est is precluded from asserting the doctrine to extinguish a cred-
itor's national law rights in the installed item1 67 or to preclude
the granting of new rights under national law after the installed
item has been removed.1 6 8
Article 29(7) therefore provides relief to holders of non-regis-
trable, purely national rights in items. It does not apply to items
161 Goode, The Priority Rules, supra note 131, at 98.
162 Id.
163 Aircraft Protocol, supra note 1, art. XVI.
16 Id. arts. 1(c), II.
165 Goode, The Priority Rules, supra note 131, at 99.
166 Id.
167 Cape Town Convention, supra note 16, art. 29(7) (a).
168 Id. art. 29(7) (b).
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such as aircraft engines that are themselves registrable objects
governed by the Convention.16 9
E. NON-CONSENSUAL RIGHTS OR INTERESTS
Under Article 39 of the Convention, a contracting state is per-
mitted to declare that certain categories of NCRIs, which have
priority over an interest equivalent to an international interest,
are to have priority over registered international interests.170 Al-
though Article 39 only grants declared NCRIs priority "over reg-
istered international interests, it must follow a fortiori that the
non-consensual rights or interests have priority over unregis-
tered interests as well.""'7 Many countries, including Singapore,
have duly made such declarations. 1 7 2
Most declarations under Article 39(1) (a) relate to non-con-
sensual liens in favor of workmen and warehousemen for work
done to or services rendered in relation to objects in their pos-
session.1 7 3 Within the aviation context, mechanic's liens often
arise "with respect to repair or other services enhancing or pre-
serving the value of the aircraft."174 The primary purpose of giv-
ing such liens priority even over a perfected security interest is
that it would be "unfair to allow the secured creditor to benefit
[from the addition or preservation of value] without pay-
ment."17 5 In contrast, declarations under Article 39(1) (b) relate
to detention rights, which, unlike liens, are not based on posses-
sion. 7 6 Detention rights can arise in aviation from a variety of
circumstances ranging from unpaid airport charges and air navi-
169 Goode, The Priority Rules, supra note 131, at 99 (explaining Article XIV(3) of
the Aircraft Protocol "does not leave ownership or other rights in installed en-
gines to be dealt with by the applicable law; it lays down a positive rule that such
rights are not affected by the aircraft engine's installation or removal from the
airframe.").
170 Cape Town Convention, supra note 16, art. 39(1) (a).
171 Goode, The Priority Rules, supra note 131, at 100.
172 Declarations Deposited Under the Cape Town Convention on International Interests
in Mobile Equipment, UNIDROIT, http://www.unidroit.org/depositary-2001 cape
town?id=431 (last updated Oct. 27, 2014).
173 Goode, The Priority Rules, supra note 131, at 100; see also GRANT GILMORE,
SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY (1965) at 889-91 (citing examples of
the workman's lien, warehouseman's lien on stored goods, and common carrier's
liens on shipped goods).
174 John Pritchard & David Lloyd, Analysis of Non-Consensual Rights and Interests
under Article 39 of the Cape Town Convention, 1 CAPE TowN CONVENTION J. 3, 8
(2013).
175 Goode, The Priority Rules, supra note 131, at 100.
176 Pritchard & Lloyd, supra note 174, at 7.
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gation charges, lack of necessary licenses, unpaid tax, and even
crime and war.1 77 "Accordingly, the primary purpose for a de-
tention right can vary considerably.""1 7
Article 40, on the other hand, allows contracting states to de-
clare certain categories of NCRIs registrable and subsume them
to regulation under the Convention and Aircraft Protocol as if
they were international interests."7 Article 40 does not make
these NCRIs international interests; it merely allows them to be
treated as international interests for priority purposes under the
Convention and Aircraft Protocol.s 0
Article 39 and Article 40 are therefore different. Article 39
exempts NCRIs declared under it from the Convention and Air-
craft Protocol's registration requirements and the first-to-regis-
ter rule, but these NCRIs are not entitled to recognition in
other contracting states unless the conflict-of-law rules of the
state so require because the priority granted by such exemption
is not a Convention priority but one given by the law of the de-
claring state."' On the other hand, Article 40 applies the Con-
vention's priority rules to NCRIs registered under one
Convention,'12 which will have effect in actions and priority dis-
putes in all contracting states. Nonetheless, both aim to alleviate
the harsh operation of the bright-line first-to-register rule on na-
tional non-registrable interests.
F. PRE-EXISTING RIGHTS OR INTERESTS
"Unless otherwise declared by a [c]ontracting [s]tate, the
Convention does not apply to a pre-existing right or interest
[(PERI)], which retains the priority it enjoyed under the appli-
cable law before the effective date of the Convention."'8 3 A PERI
refers "to a right or interest of any kind in or over an object
created or arising before the effective date of [the] Conven-
tion,"184 which is the later of the date the Convention "enters
into force or the time when the [s] tate in which the debtor is
177 Id. at 10.
178 Id.
179 Cape Town Convention, supra note 16, art. 40.
180 Id.
181 Pritchard & Lloyd, supra note 174, at 14.
182 Cape Town Convention, supra note 16, art. 1 (cc) (the definition of "regis-
tered interest" includes a registrable NCRI).
183 Id. art. 60(1).
184 Id. art. 1(v).
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situated becomes a [c] ontracting [s]tate."'8 5 Holders of non-reg-
istrable rights and interests in aircraft objects created or arising
before the effective date of the Convention are then protected
from having their rights subrogated to a later-created registered
interest.
VI. CONCLUSION: BALANCING CONFLICTING
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
By most accounts, the Convention and Aircraft Protocol have
been remarkably successful in harmonizing the law governing
secured transactions in aircraft equipment, boasting sixty and
fifty-four contracting states respectively to date.1 86 This has been
attributed to the innovative use of protocols in a "hub-and-
spoke" convention-protocol approach,"' unprecedented in-
volvement of industry players in the drafting process,18 and the
priority given to commercial expediency over the more tradi-
tional approach of harmonization that is guided by the idea of
drafting an instrument that represents a common ground or
compromise between common law and civil law systems.'89
The economic promise held by the Convention and Aircraft
Protocol appears to have been fulfilled as indicated by the posi-
tive results of various independent studies commissioned by the
AWG that attempt to assess and quantify the economic benefits
of the Convention and Aircraft Protocol.o90 For example, a 2009
independent study found that "ratification and effective imple-
mentation of the [Convention and Aircraft Protocol by national
authorities resulted] in significant risk reduction to lenders to
secured aircraft financing transactions.""' Additionally, a 2010
independent study submitted to the government of the United
185 Id. art. 60(2)(a).
186 Status-Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, supra note
13; Status-Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on
Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment, supra note 13.
187 Sundahl, supra note 15, at 354-61.
188 Lorne S. Clark, The 2001 Cape Town Convention on International Interests in
Mobile Equipment and Aircraft Equipment Protocol: Internationalising Asset-Based Fi-
nancing Principles for the Acquisition of Aircraft Engines, 69 J. AIR L. & COM. 3, 3-4
(2004); Sandeep Gopalan, Harmonization of Commercial Law: Lessons from the Cape
Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, 9 L. & Bus. REv. Am.
255, 270 (2003).
189 Gopalan, supra note 188, at 268.
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Kingdom found that "accession to and effective implementation
of the Convention and Aircraft Protocol will result in decreased
credit risk and lower credit cost in their economy.' 2 Although
more empirical quantitative studies may be required to prove
beyond doubt the purported economic benefits of the Conven-
tion and Aircraft Protocol, the consensus at present is that ratifi-
cation of the Convention and Aircraft Protocol brings with it
more economic benefits than costs. If the lifetime of the Con-
vention and Aircraft Protocol is too short for a conclusive empir-
ical quantitative study, it is noteworthy that UCC Article 9, the
predominant influence behind the Convention and its proto-
cols, has been credited with "unleashing a stream of capital that
contributed to the American post-war boom""' by encouraging
lending by financial institutions.
In Part III, this article explained how the Convention and Air-
craft Protocol's International Registry and bright-line first-to-
register rule contribute to their chief objective of facilitating ef-
ficient financing of transportation equipment by providing a
sound legal regime that reduces credit risk to an extent that in-
duces financiers to assume risk and release funds.19 4 This objec-
tive is furthered by increased transparency, legal certainty, and
efficiency; efficient risk-allocation; and practical compatibility
with aviation finance that the Convention and Aircraft Proto-
col's International Registry and bright-line first-to-register rule
offers. Parts IV(A) and (B) completed the cost-benefit analysis
by showing that concerns about the economic costs of a registra-
tion system working in tandem with a first-to-register rule are
groundless.
However, unless one takes the often-discredited utilitarian ap-
proach, net economic benefit cannot be the only consideration
in the design of any national or international legal regime.
Often, some economic benefit must be eschewed in the name of
equity. The discomfort with inequity is at the heart of the more
persuasive criticisms directed at the Article 29(1)'s bright-line
first-to-register rule-that it disadvantages certain classes of
creditors, whether they are creditors living in different time
zones from the register or creditors holding non-registrable, na-
192 Vadirn Linetsky, Accession to the Cape Town Convention by the UK: An Economic
Impact Assessment Study, AVIATION WORKING GROUP, http://www.awg.aero/assets/
docs/UKCTC%20Econ%2OImpact%2OFinal%2OVersion.pdf.
193 Sundahl, supra note 15, at 345.
194 GOODE, EXPLANATORY REPORT AND COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 2.
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tional interests not recognized by the Convention and Aircraft
Protocol. 19
In Parts IV(C), (D), and V, this article sought to demonstrate
that the technical workings of the electronic International Regis-
try and the exceptions to the bright-line first-to-register rule con-
tained within the Convention and Aircraft Protocol adequately
address the concerns regarding equity. These exceptions oper-
ate in various ways: (1) making non-registrable interests registra-
ble such that the Convention and Aircraft Protocol's priority
rules apply to them as if they were registrable international in-
terests (e.g., outright sales and Article 40 NCRIs);19 6 (2) making
declared non-registrable interests exempt from the Convention
and Aircraft Protocol's priority rules (e.g., Article 39 NCRIs);197
(3) allowing some holders of non-registrable interests to rely on
the Convention and Aircraft Protocol's priority rules without in-
dependent registration of these interests (e.g., insurance and
loss-related proceeds and conditional buyers and lessees);1 98 (4)
exempting non-registrable interests from the Convention and
Aircraft Protocol's priority rules without registration (e.g., PE-
RIs); 19 ' and (5) preventing holders of international interests
from asserting a common property law doctrine to extinguish
non-registrable interests (e.g., exclusion of doctrine of acces-
sion) .200 Nevertheless, they share a common purpose-alleviat-
ing the harsh operation of Article 29(1)'s bright-line first-to-
register rule on non-registrable interests.
In fact, these numerous exceptions have been criticized for
limiting the predictability and efficiency benefits of the first-to-
register rule, but a balance has to be struck where there are con-
flicting policy considerations.
Aside from equity, Article 39 has also been justified on the
basis that "affording certain creditors the protection of priority
NCRIs will facilitate the smooth day-to-day provision of aviation
services to the public" because "the laws of many jurisdictions
grant priority to NCRIs covering fees accrued by operators that
fund governmental services such as air traffic control and air-
port operations as well as expenses incurred by operators for
195 See discussion supra Part IV.
196 Goode, The Priority Rules, supra note 131, at 100.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 98.
199 Id. at 100.
200 Id. at 99.
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equipment maintenance."201 The fact that the existence of a sep-
arate international convention governing receivables factored
into the Convention and Aircraft Protocol's drafting decision to
decline the creation of an exception for interests in general pro-
ceeds indicates that inter-convention coherency is another pol-
icy consideration that must be taken into account in
international law-making. 202 Ultimately, the law of cross-border
secured transactions is extremely broad and the Convention and
its protocols constitute an ambitious attempt at harmonizing the
highly specific area of security interests in high-value mobile
transportation assets. To extend the scope of the Convention
and its protocols to general proceeds that have no continuing
linkage with the object from which they were derived would be
to overstep the original mandate into that of another interna-
tional regime.
The exceptions balance the conflicting policy considerations
with legal devices such as Article 39's declaration requirements,
which make non-registrable interests more transparent so that
financiers "have a fair opportunity to factor the resulting risk
and uncertainty into decisions about whether to provide support
to the [s]tate's operators and at what price and on what terms
and conditions."203
In conclusion, this article submits that the bright-line first-to-
register rule and its exceptions contained in the Convention
and Aircraft Protocol strike an adequate balance between the
conflicting considerations of economic benefit, equity, provision
of necessary public services, and inter-convention coherency. In
order to definitively pronounce on the normative desirability of
the bright-line first-to-register rule and its exceptions, an empiri-
cal study of how they have functioned in practice to identify any
unforeseen practical problems is necessary, but that is for a fu-
ture article. For a start, this article has demonstrated that this
rule and its exceptions stand up well to rigorous theoretical
analysis.
201 Pritchard & Lloyd, supra note 174, at 13. Manyjurisdictions have specifically
declared unpaid governmental taxes and charges as NCRIs under Article
39(1) (a), and declared under Article 39(1) (b) that the Convention does not af-
fect the right of governmental or private providers of public services to arrest or
detain an aircraft object in accordance with applicable domestic law for payment
directly relating to such services in respect of such object. Id. at 13 n.51.
202 See id. at 13.
203 Id.
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